Abstract-In this paper, we study user profile matching with privacy-preservation in mobile social networks (MSNs) and introduce a family of novel profile matching protocols. We first propose an explicit Comparison-based Profile Matching protocol (eCPM) which runs between two parties, an initiator and a responder. The eCPM enables the initiator to obtain the comparison-based matching result about a specified attribute in their profiles, while preventing their attribute values from disclosure. We then propose an implicit Comparison-based Profile Matching protocol (iCPM) which allows the initiator to directly obtain some messages instead of the comparison result from the responder. The messages unrelated to user profile can be divided into multiple categories by the responder. The initiator implicitly chooses the interested category which is unknown to the responder. Two messages in each category are prepared by the responder, and only one message can be obtained by the initiator according to the comparison result on a single attribute. We further generalize the iCPM to an implicit Predicate-based Profile Matching protocol (iPPM) which allows complex comparison criteria spanning multiple attributes. The anonymity analysis shows all these protocols achieve the confidentiality of user profiles. In addition, the eCPM reveals the comparison result to the initiator and provides only conditional anonymity; the iCPM and the iPPM do not reveal the result at all and provide full anonymity. We analyze the communication overhead and the anonymity strength of the protocols. We then present an enhanced version of the eCPM, called eCPM+, by combining the eCPM with a novel prediction-based adaptive pseudonym change strategy. The performance of the eCPM and the eCPM+ are comparatively studied through extensive trace-based simulations. Simulation results demonstrate that the eCPM+ achieves significantly higher anonymity strength with slightly larger number of pseudonyms than the eCPM.
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E(0), …, E(1), …, E(0)
In the MSNs, we consider a generalized function to support information exchange by using profile matching as a metric. Following the previous example, we consider two CIA agents with two different priority levels in the CIA system, A with a low priority l A and B with a high priority l B . They know each other as a CIA agent. However, they do not want to reveal their priority levels to each other. B wants to share some messages to A. The messages are not related to user profile, and they are divided into multiple categories, e.g., the messages related to different regions (New York or Beijing) in different years (2011 or 2012) . B shares one message of a specified category T at a time. The category T is chosen by A, but the choice is unknown to B. For each category, B prepares two self-defined messages, e.g., a low-confidential message for the CIA agent at a lower level and a high-confidential message for the agent at a higher level. Because l A < l B , A eventually obtains the low-confidential message without knowing that it is a lowconfidential one. In the meantime, B does not know which message A receives. The above function offers both A and B the highest anonymity since neither the comparison result between l A and l B is disclosed to A or B nor the category T of A's interest is disclosed to B. In the following, we refer to A as the initiator u i , B as the responder u j , the attribute used in the comparison (i.e., priority level) as a x , and the category T of A's interest as T y . The attribute values of u i and u j on the attribute a x are denoted by a i,x and a j,x , respectively. We first formally describe two scenarios from the above examples.
Scenario-1:
The initiator wants to know the comparison result, i.e., whether it has a value larger, equal, or smaller than the responder on a specified attribute. For example, as shown in Fig. 1 (a) , the initiator u i expects to know if
Scenario-2: The initiator expects that the responder shares one message related to the category of its interest, which is however kept unknown to the responder. In the meantime, the responder wants to share with the initiator one message which is determined by the comparison result of their attribute values. For example, as shown in Fig. 1 (b) , both u i and u j know that a x is used in the comparison and the categories of messages are T 1 , · · · , T λ . The initiator u i first generates a (0, 1)-vector where the y-th dimension value is 1 and other dimension values are 0. Then, u i encrypts the vector with its own public key and sends the ciphertexts (E(0), · · · , E(1), · · · , E(0)) to the responder u j . The ciphertexts imply u i 's interested category T y , but u j is unable to know T y since E(0) and E(1) are non-distinguishable without a decryption key. u i also provides its attribute value a i,x in an encrypted form so that u j is unable to obtain a i,x . On the other hand, u j prepares λ pairs of messages, each pair (s 1,h , s 0,h ) relating to one category T h (1 ≤ h ≤ λ). u j executes a calculation over the ciphertexts and sends the result to u i . Finally, 
A. Problem Statement
In the literature, there are many privacy-preserving profile matching protocols [10] , [20] - [23] . They aim to determine the overall similarity of two profiles rather than their relation in specific attributes. They commonly check whether the proximity measure of the two profiles is larger, equal, or smaller than a pre-defined threshold value. The proximity measurement can be the size of the intersection of two sets or the distance of two vectors where sets and vectors are used to represent profiles. They do not consider the larger, equal, or smaller relations of the attribute values as the matching metrics. Moreover, the profile matching results are revealed to the participating users in certain conditions, and behavior Consider users adopt the multiple-pseudonym technique [24] , [25] , i.e., users achieve high anonymity by frequently changing the unlinkable pseudonyms in the communication. As shown in Fig. 2 , users u k and u j both change their pseudonyms at time t and t (> t). Since the matching result between u k and u i is non-unique value 0.7, u i is unable to link u k 's behavior. However, u i is likely to know that user u j stays in its neighborhood because the matching result remains to be 0.1 which is much distinctive from other matching results. In addition, if 0.1 is unique among all possible matching results of users, they would easily recognize each other by executing the matching protocols though their profiles are not disclosed. Hence, the privacy protection of users is related to both their profiles and their profile matching results. Considering a user has ν possible instances of the profile, we classify the anonymity of profile matching into three classes, nonanonymity, conditional anonymity, and full anonymity, based on the following definition.
Definition 1 (Non-Anonymity).
A profile matching protocol provides non-anonymity if after attackers execute multiple runs of the protocol with a user, the probability of correctly guessing the profile of the user is equal to 1.
Definition 2 (Conditional Anonymity). A profile matching protocol achieves conditional anonymity if after attackers execute multiple runs of the protocol with a user, the probability of correctly guessing the profile of the user is larger than
1 ν .
Definition 3 (Full Anonymity). A profile matching protocol achieves full anonymity if after attackers execute multiple runs of the protocol with a user, the probability of correctly guessing the profile of the user is always
The profile matching protocols [21] - [23] allow the users to obtain the profile matching results which contain partial profile information. Further, the profile matching results may cause behavior linkage in certain conditions such that the revealed profile information will be correlated to break user anonymity. By cross-checking the profile matching results with the profile set, some possible instances may be excluded, and then the probability of correctly guessing the profile of the target user must be larger than 1 ν . Thus, the previous works [21] - [23] only provide conditional anonymity. In this paper, we aim to design the profile matching protocols with conditional anonymity and full anonymity. We propose an explicit Comparison-based Profile Matching protocol (eCPM) with conditional anonymity, an Two attribute values of u i and u j [1, l] The range of attribute values
The categories of messages Ty
The category of the initiator u i 's interest pid i and pid j
The pseudonyms of u i and u j pk i and pk j The public keys of u i and u j cert pid i
The certificate on (pid i , pk i ) s 1,y and s 0,y Two messages in the category Ty Π The predicate set by the responder u j A The attribute set of Π, |A| = n t
The threshold value of Π implicit Comparison-based Profile Matching protocol (iCPM) and an implicit Predicate-based Profile Matching protocol (iPPM) both with full anonymity.
B. Network Model
We consider a homogenous MSN composed of N mobile users. Users have equal wireless communication range, and the communication is bi-directional. The multi-pseudonym technique [24] , [25] is adopted to preserve user identity and location privacy, i.e., users use pseudonyms rather than their real identities during communication and change their pseudonyms periodically. A Trusted Central Authority (TCA) is used for bootstrapping but not involved in user communication. During the bootstrapping, the TCA generates profiles, pseudonyms and associated certificates for individual users.
Similar to previous works [22] , [23] , each user is assumed to have w attributes, and its profile is a w-dimension vector spanning all these attributes. An integer value between 1 and l is assigned to each dimension, representing the priority level, knowledge level, or capability of users on the corresponding attribute. Therefore, a user u i will have a profile
For the messages to be shared, they are divided into λ categories T h for 1 ≤ h ≤ λ. A non-exhaustive list of notations to be used throughout the rest of the paper can be found in Table 1 .
Malicious users exist in the network. They are curious about the personal information of others, such as unique identities, location and profiles. Personal information revealed in profile matching imposes direct privacy threats to users. Fractions of such information may be aggregated by colluding users, and the behavior of the target user may be linked [15] , [16] . To prevent privacy violation completely, personal information, and even profile matching results must not be disclosed. Protocol-dependent techniques are needed for preventing behavior linkage.
C. Our Contributions
In this paper, we propose a family of novel protocols eCPM, iCPM, and iPPM to solve the considered profile matching problems based on the above network model. These protocols rely on the homomorphic encryption to protect the content of user profiles from disclosure. They provide increasing levels of anonymity (from conditional to full). Our contributions are summarized below.
Firstly, we propose the eCPM for Scenario-1. For a specified attribute, the eCPM allows the initiator to know the comparison result, i.e., whether it has a larger, equal, or smaller value than the responder on the attribute. Due to the exposure of the comparison result, user profile will be leaked and linked in some conditions. We provide a numerical analysis on the conditional anonymity of the eCPM. We study the anonymity risk level in relation to the pseudonym change for the consecutive eCPM runs.
Secondly, we propose the iCPM for Scenario-2. In this protocol, the responder prepares multiple categories of messages where two messages are generated for each category. The initiator can obtain only one message related to one category for each run. During the protocol, the responder is unable to know the category of the initiator's interest. To receive which message in the category is dependent on the comparison result on a specified attribute. The responder does not know which message the initiator receives, while the initiator cannot derive the comparison result from the received message. We provide an analysis of the effectiveness of the iCPM, and show that the iCPM achieves full anonymity.
Thirdly, we extend the iCPM to obtain the iPPM, which has the same anonymity property as the iCPM. The iPPM allows the comparisons of multiple attributes for profile matching. The responder defines a predicate, similar to [26] , which is a logical expression made of multiple comparisons between its own attribute values and the initiator's attribute values. The initiator receives one message from the responder corresponding to the specified category. To receive which message in the category is dependent on whether the initiator's attribute values satisfy the predicate or not. We provide an analysis of the effectiveness of the iPPM.
Fourthly, we improve the eCPM by combining it with an adaptive pseudonym change strategy and obtain a new variant eCPM+. In the eCPM+, each user measures its current neighborhood status periodically and predicts its future neighborhood status using an Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) model. Based on the aggregate neighborhood status since last pseudonym change, it periodically estimates its anonymity risk level and changes its pseudonym when the level is too high. The extensive trace-based simulation shows that eCPM+ achieves significantly higher anonymity strength with slightly larger number of used pseudonyms than the eCPM.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We review existing profile matching protocols in Sec. II and introduce some fundamental techniques in Sec. III. The three protocols eCPM, iCPM, and iPPM are presented respectively in Sec. IV-VI, along with the effectiveness discussion. Their communication overhead and anonymity strength are analyzed in Sec. VII. We present the eCPM+ in Sec. VIII and evaluate its performance in Sec. IX. Finally, we conclude the paper in Sec. X.
II. RELATED WORK
Mobile social networks as emerging social communication platforms [27] - [29] have attracted great attention recently, and their mobile applications have been developed and implemented pervasively. In mobile social networking applications, profile matching acts as a critical initial step to help users, especially strangers, initialize conversation with each other in a distributed manner. Yang et al. [30] introduced a distributed mobile communication system, called E-SmallTalker, which facilitates social networking in physical proximity. ESmallTalker automatically discovers and suggests common topics between users for easy conversation. Lu et al. [20] studied e-healthcare cases by proposing a symptom matching scheme for mobile health social networks. They considered that such matching scheme is valuable to the patients who have the same symptom to exchange their experiences, mutual support, and inspiration with each other.
In general, the profile matching can be categorized based on the formats of profiles and the types of matching operations. A well-known profile matching is the FNP scheme [19] , where a client and a server compute their intersection set such that the client gets the result while the server learns nothing. Later, Kissner et al. [31] implemented profile matching with more operations including set intersection, union, cardinality and over-threshold operations. On the other hand, Ye et al. [32] further extended the FNP scheme to a distributed private matching scheme and Dachman-Soled et al. [33] aimed at reducing the protocol complexity. All the above solutions to the set intersection rely on homomorphic encryption operation. In the meantime, other works [34] , [35] employed an oblivious pseudo random function to build their profile matching protocols, where communication and computational efficiency is improved. Li et al. [21] implemented profile matching according to three increasing privacy levels: i) revealing the common attribute set of the two users; ii) revealing the size of the common attribute set; and iii) revealing the size rank of the common attribute sets between a user and its neighbors. They considered an honest-but-curious (HBC) adversary model, which assumes that users try to learn more information than allowed by inferring from the profile matching results, but honestly following the protocol. They applied secure multiparty computation, the Shamir secret sharing scheme, and the homomorphic encryption scheme to achieve the confidentiality of user profiles.
In another category of profile matching [22] , [23] , [36] , profiles can be represented as vectors, and matching operation can be inner product or distance. Such profile matching is a special instance of the secure two-party computation, which was initially introduced by Yao [37] and later generalized to the secure multi-party computation by Goldreich et al. [38] . Specifically, we introduce two recent works in this category. Dong et al. [23] considered user profile consisting of attribute values and measured the proximity of two user profiles using dot product f dot (u, v) . An existing dot product protocol [39] is improved to enable verifiable secure computation. The improved protocol only reveals whether the dot product is above or below a given threshold. The threshold value is selected by the user who initiates the profile matching. They pointed out the potential anonymity risk of their protocols; an adversary may adaptively adjust the threshold value to quickly narrow down the value range of the victim profile. Thus, it is required that the threshold value must be larger than a pre-defined lower bound (a system parameter) to guarantee user anonymity. The same problem exists in other works [21] , [22] . Furthermore, Dong et al. [23] required users to make a commitment about their profiles to ensure the profile consistency, but profile forgery attack may still take place during the commitment phase. In the same category, Zhang et al. [22] (u, v) , and the other only learns f dis ; ii) one of them learns f dis (u, v) , and the other learns nothing; and iii) one of them learns whether f dis (u, v) < τ, and the other learns nothing.
The proposed profile matching protocols are novel since the comparison of attribute values is considered as the matching operation. The intuitive idea is inspired by the famous Yao's millionaires' problem [37] and its solution [40] . Similar to other works [21] - [23] , we propose three different protocols with different anonymity levels. For the eCPM with conditional anonymity, we provide detailed anonymity analysis and show the relation between pseudonym change and anonymity variation. For the iCPM and the iPPM with full anonymity, we show that the use of these protocols does not affect user anonymity level and users are able to completely preserve their privacy.
III. PRIMITIVES
In this section, we introduce homomorphic encryption and Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) model that will be used in our proposed profile matching protocols.
A. Homomorphic Encryption
There are several existing homomorphic encryption schemes that support different operations such as addition and multiplication on ciphertexts, e.g. [41] , [42] . By using these schemes, a user is able to process the encrypted plaintext without knowing the secret keys. Due to this property, homomorphic encryption schemes are widely used in data aggregation and computation specifically for privacy-sensitive content [43] . We review the homomorphic encryption scheme [42] that serves a building block of our proposed profile matching protocols.
A central authority runs a generator G which outputs p, q, R, R q , R p , χ as system public parameters:
• p < q are two primes s.t. q ≡ 1 mod 4 and p l;
Suppose •
Consider the two ciphertexts c i,
• Addition:
• Multiplication: Let v be a symbolic variable and compute (
B. Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) Model
Autoregressive model (AR) is a classic tool for understanding and predicting a time series data [44] . It estimates the current term z k of the series by a linear weighted sum of previous p terms (i.e., observations) in the series. The model order p is generally much smaller than the length of the series. AR is often combined with Moving-Average model (MA) to obtain complex ARMA model for generally improved accuracy. While AR depends on the previous terms of a time series data, MA describes the current value of the series using a linear weighted sum of white Gaussian noise or random shocks of its prior q values. As a straightforward combination of AR and MA, ARMA model is notated as ARMA(p, q) and written as
where c is a constant standing for the mean of the series, φ i the autoregression coefficients, θ i the moving-average coefficients, and k the zero-mean white Gaussian noise error. For simplicity, the constant c is often omitted. Deriving ARMA(p, q) involves determining the coefficients φ i for i ∈ [1 · · · p] and for j ∈ [1..q] that give a good prediction. The model can be updated as new samples arrive so as to ensure accuracy, or it may be recomputed only when the prediction is too far from the true measurement. ARMA modeling has been applied to solve various problems, e.g. routing [45] , and it will be used in Sec. VIII to enable pre-adaptive pseudonym change.
IV. EXPLICIT COMPARISON-BASED APPROACH
In this section, we present the explicit Comparison-based Profile Matching protocol, i.e., eCPM. This protocol allows two users to compare their attribute values on a specified attribute without disclosing the values to each other. But, the protocol reveals the comparison result to the initiator, and therefore offers conditional anonymity.
A. Bootstrapping
The protocol has a fundamental bootstrapping phase, where the TCA generates all system parameters, user pseudonyms, and keying materials. Specifically, the TCA runs G to generate p, q, R, R q , R p , χ for initiating the homomorphic encryption (see Sec. III-A). The TCA generates a pair of public and private keys (pk T CA , sk T CA ) for itself. The public key pk T CA is open to all users; the private key sk T CA is a secret which will be used to issue certificates for user pseudonyms and keying materials, as shown below.
The TCA generates disjoint sets of pseudonyms (pid i ) and disjoint sets of homomorphic public keys (pk i ) for users (u i ). For every pid i and pk i of u i , the TCA generates the corresponding secret keys psk i and sk i . In correspondence to each pseudonym pid i , it assigns a certificate cert pidi to u i , which can be used to confirm the validity of pid i . Generally, the TCA uses sk T CA to generate a signature on pid i and pk i . The TCA outputs cert pidi as a tuple (pk i , Sign skTCA (pid i , pk i )). The homomorphic secret key sk i is delivered to u i together with psk i ; pk i is tied to pid i and varies as the change of pseudonyms.
B. Protocol Steps
Consider user u i with a neighboring user u j . Denote by pid i the current pseudonym of u i and by pid j that of u j . Recall that a x is an attribute, a i,x and a j,x the values of u i and u j on a x , and l the largest attribute value. Suppose that u i as an initiator starts profile matching on a x with a responder u j . Let psk i and psk j be the secret keys corresponding to pid i and pid j , respectively. The protocol is executed as follows.
Step 1. u i calculates d i = E pki (a i,x ), and sends a 5-tuple
Step 2. After receiving the 5-tuple, u j opens the certificate cert pidi and obtains the homomorphic public key pk i and a signature. It checks cert pidi to verify that (pk i , pid i ) are generated by the TCA, and it checks the signature to validate (a x , d i ). If any check is failed, u j stops; otherwise, u j proceeds as follows. It uses pk i to encrypt its own attribute value a j,x , i.e., d j = E pki (a j,x ); it chooses a random value ϕ ∈ Z p such that 1 ≤ ϕ < p/(2l) and m|ϕ for any integer m ∈ [1, l − 1] (ϕ can be chosen dependent on u j 's anonymity requirement). By the homomorphic property, it calculates
Step 3. After receiving the 5-tuple, u i opens the certificate cert pidj and checks the signature to make sure the validity of pid j and (a x , d j ) . If the check is successful, u i uses sk i to decrypt d j and obtains the comparison result c = ϕ(
C. Effectiveness Discussion
The effectiveness of the eCPM is guaranteed by the following theorems.
Theorem 1 (Correctness).
In the eCPM, the initiator u i is able to obtain the correct comparison result with the responder u j on a specified attribute a x .
Proof: Recall p l and whether a i,x > a j,x , a i,x = a j,x , or a i,x < a j,x . 
Theorem 2 (Anonymity). The eCPM does not disclose the attribute values of participating users.
Proof: The initiator u i who starts the protocol for attribute a x encrypts its attribute value a i,x using its homomorphic public key pk i . Thus, the responder u j is unable to know any information about a i,x . On the other side, the responder u j does not transmit its attribute value a j,x , but returns ϕ(a i,x − a j,x ) to u i , where ϕ is a random factor added for anonymity. Since m|ϕ for 1 ≤ m ≤ l − 1, we have m|(ϕ(a i,x − a j,x )). Thus, (a i,x − a j,x ) can be any value between −(l − 1) and l − 1 from u i 's view, and the exact value of a j,x is thus protected.
Theorem 3 (Non-forgeability). The eCPM discourages profile forgery attack at the cost of involving the TCA for signature verification and data decryption.
Proof: Consider two users u i and u j running the eCPM with each other on attribute a x . Their public keys pk i and pk j used for homomorphic encryption are generated by the TCA, and the TCA has full knowledge of the corresponding private keys sk i and sk j . In addition, their attribute values are generated by the TCA and recorded in the TCA's local repository, and the TCA can retrieve any attribute value of users (e.g. a i,x or a j,x ) anytime when necessary. After the two users finish the protocol, u i will have Sign pskj (d j ), and u j will have Sign pski (d i ). If u i (u j ) uses the forged profile in the protocol, u j (u i ) can cooperate with the TCA to trace such malicious attack. Specifically, u j (u i ) can send Sign pski (d i ) (Sign pskj (d j )) to the TCA. the TCA will be able to check if the signatures are valid and the encrypted values are consistent with a i,x and a j,x . Thus, any profile forgery attack can be detected with the help from the TCA, and such attacks will be discouraged.
V. IMPLICIT COMPARISON-BASED APPROACH
In this section, we propose the implicit Comparison-based Profile Matching (iCPM) by adopting the oblivious transfer cryptographic technique [40] . We consider users have distinct values for any given attribute. As shown in Fig. 3 , the iCPM consists of three main steps. In the first step, u i chooses an interested category T y by setting y-th element to 1 and other elements to 0 in a λ-length vector V i . u i then encrypts the vector by using the homomorphic encryption and sends the encrypted vector to u j . Thus, u j is unable to know T y but still can process on the ciphertext. In the second step, u j computes the ciphertexts with input of self-defined messages (s 1,h , s 0,h ) for 1 ≤ h ≤ λ, two encrypted vectors (m i , d i ), and its own attribute value a j,x . In the last step, u i decrypts the ciphertext and obtains s 1,y if a i,x > a j,x or s 0,y if a i,x < a j, 
A. Protocol Steps
In the iCPM, the responder u j prepares λ pairs of messages (s 0,h , s 1,h ) for category T h (1 ≤ h ≤ λ) where s 0,h , s 1,h ∈ Z p and s 0,h , s 1,h ≤ (p − 1)/2. These messages are not related to u j 's profile. The initiator u i first decides which category T y it wants to receive messages related to. But u i does not disclose T y to u j . Then, the responder u j shares either s 0,y or s 1,y to u i without knowing which one will be received by u i . When the protocol finishes, u i receives either s 0,y or s 1,y with no clue about the comparison result. We elaborate the protocol steps below.
Step 1. u i generates a vector
, where v y = 1 and v h = 0 for 1 ≤ h ≤ λ and h = y. This vector implies that u i is interested in the category
, where θ = log l , and
Step 2. After receiving the 6-tuple, u j checks if (pid i , cert pidi ) are generated by the TCA and the signature is generated by u i . If both checks are successful, it knows that (a x , d i , m i ) is valid. u j proceeds as follows: 1) Convert a j,x to binary bits b j,x,1 , · · · , b j,x,θ and compute
which implies γ t = 2γ t−1 + ζ t . 5) Select a random r t ∈ R p in the form of ax + b where a, b ∈ Z p , a = 0, and compute
, and makes a random permutation to obtain d j = P(E pki (μ)). It finally sends a 5- tuple (pid j , cert pidj , a x , d j , Sign pskj (a x , d j ) ) to u i .
Step 3. u i checks the validity of the received 5-tuple. Then, it decrypts every ciphertext E pki (μ t ) in d j as follows: for
, u i is able to find a plaintext μ t ∈ Z p and μ t = 2s 1,y ≤ p − 1 and computes s 1,y ; if a i,x < a j,x , u i is able to find μ t = 2s 0,y and computes s 0,y .
B. Effectiveness Discussion
The correctness of the iCPM can be verified as follows. If a i,x > a j,x , then there must exist a position, say the t * -th position, in the binary expressions of a i,x and a j,x such that b i,x,t * = 1, b j,x,t * = 0 and b i,x,t = b j,x,t for all t < t * . Since γ t = 2γ t−1 +ζ t , we have γ t = 0, γ t * = 1, and δ t * = 1. For t > t * , we have γ t ≥ 2, and δ t is a random value due to r t . Since s 0,y and s 1,y are elements of Z p and r t is in the form of ax + b (a, b ∈ Z p , a = 0), u i can always determine the effective plaintext from others. The effective plaintext will The confidentiality of user profiles is guaranteed by the homomorphic encryption. The comparison result δ t is always in the encrypted format, and δ t is not directly disclosed to u i . The revealed information is either s 1,y or s 0,y which is unrelated to user profiles. Therefore, the protocol transactions do not help in guessing the profiles, and the full anonymity is provided. In the meantime, vector V i is always in an encrypted format so that u j is unable to know the interested category T y of u i . In addition, u j ensures that only one of s 1,y and s 0,y will be revealed to u i . The non-forgeability property is similar to that of the eCPM. u i will not lie as it makes signature Sign pski (a x , d i ) and gives it to u j . The profile forgery attack will be detected if u j reports the signature to the TCA. Moreover, u j has no need to lie as it can achieve the same objective by simply modifying the contents of s 1,y and s 0,y .
VI. IMPLICIT PREDICATE-BASED APPROACH
Both the eCPM and the iCPM perform profile matching on a single attribute. For a matching involving multiple attributes, they have to be executed multiple times, each time on one attribute. In this section, we extend the iCPM to the multiattribute cases, without jeopardizing its anonymity property, and obtain an implicit Predicate-based Profile Matching protocol, i.e., iPPM. This protocol relies on a predicate which is a logical expression made of multiple comparisons spanning distinct attributes and thus supports sophisticated matching criteria within a single protocol run.
As shown in Fig. 4 , the iPPM is composed of three main steps. In the first step, different from the iCPM, u i sends to u j n encrypted vectors of its attribute values corresponding to the attributes in A where A (|A| = n ≤ w) is the attribute set of the predicate Π. In the second step, u j sets 2λ polynomial functions f sat,h (x), f unsat,h (x) for 1 ≤ h ≤ λ. u j then generates 2λn secret shares from f sat,h (x), f unsat,h (x) by choosing 1 ≤ h ≤ λ, 1 ≤ x ≤ n, and arranges them in a certain structure according to the predicate Π. For every 2λ secret shares with the same index h, similar to the step 2 of the iCPM, u j generates θ ciphertexts. u j obtains nθ ciphertexts at the end of the second step. In the third step, u i decrypts these nθ ciphertexts and finds n secret shares of s 1,y and s 0,y . u j finally can obtain s 1,y or s 0,y from the secret shares.
A. Protocol Steps
The iPPM is obtained by combining the iCPM with a secret sharing scheme [46] to support a predicate matching. The initiator u i sends its attribute values corresponding to the attributes in A to the responder u j . Without loss of generality, we assume A = {a 1 , · · · , a n }. Then, u j defines a predicate Π = "t of {(a i,x , opt, a j,x )|a x ∈ A}", where the comparison operator opt is either > or < andt ≤ n. The predicate contains n number of requirements (i.e., comparisons), each for a distinct a x . The responder u j determines λ pairs of messages (s 0,h , s 1,h ) for attributes a h (1 ≤ h ≤ λ). The initiator u i receives s 1,h if at leastt of the n requirements are satisfied, or s 0,h otherwise. Similar to the iCPM, T y is determined by u i but unknown to u j . The threshold gate 1 ≤t ≤ n is chosen by u j . When n = 1, the iPPM reduces to the iCPM. The protocol steps are given below.
, where v y = 1 and v h = 0 for 1 ≤ h ≤ λ and z = y, and sets
). In addition, u i selects the attribute set A (|A| = n), and sends a 6-tuple Step 2. u j checks the validity of the received 6-tuple (similar to the Step 2 of the iCPM). It creates a predicate Π and chooses the threshold gatet. Using the secret sharing scheme [46] , u j creates 2λ polynomials: 1,h are random numbers from Z * p . For each attribute a x ∈ A, it calculates the secret shares of s 1,h,x and s 0,h,x as follows (s 1,h,x , s 0,h,x ≤ (p − 1)/2 are required):
Note that u j adds a prefix 0 or 1 to each secret share such that u i is able to differentiate the two sets of shared secrets, one for s 1,h , the other for s 0,h . u j runs the Step 2 of the iCPM n times, each time for a distinct attribute a x ∈ A and with (s 1,h,x , s 0,h,x ) for (1 ≤ h ≤ λ) being input as s 1,h and s 0,h , respectively. u j then obtains d j including nθ ciphertexts. Finally, it sends a 6-tuple
Step 3. u i checks the validity of the received 6-tuple. u i can obtain n secret shares, and each of these shares is either for s 0,y or s 1,y . It then classifies the n shares into two groups by looking at the starting bit (either '0' or '1'). Thus, if Π is satisfied, u i can obtain at leastt secret shares of s 1,y and be able to recover s 1,y ; otherwise, it must obtain at least n−t+1 secret shares of s 0,y and can recover s 0,y .
B. Effectiveness Discussion
The correctness of the iPPM is as follows. At Step 2, the responder u j executes the Step 2 of the iCPM n times, each time it effectively delivers only one secret share of either s 0,y or s 1,y to u i . When u i receives eithert shares of s 1,y or n −t + 1 shares of s 0,y , it can recover either s 1,y or s 0,y . The interpolation function corresponding to the secret sharing scheme always guarantees the correctness. The anonymity and non-forgeability of the iPPM are achieved similar to those of the iCPM and the eCPM, respectively.
VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analytically study the performance of three proposed protocols eCPM, iCPM, and iPPM in terms of communication overhead and anonymity strength. When analyzing anonymity, we consider the case that users have distinct values for any given attribute. Non-distinct attribute values and comparison operations "≥" and "≤" will be considered in our future work.
A. Communication Overhead
Let |R| be the size of one ring element in R q . In the eCPM, the initiator and the responder both need to send ciphertexts in size of 2|R|, and the communication overhead is thus subject only to the system parameter |R|.
In order to achieve full anonymity, the iCPM constructs ciphertext in a sequence of operations. From Sec. III-A, we know |Enc(b)| = 2|R|. Thus, the communication overhead of the initiator is 2(θ + λ)|R| with θ = log l . It can be seen that the initiator's communication overhead increases with system parameters (θ, λ). According to Sec. III-A an addition operation of homomorphic encryption does not increase the ciphertext size, while a multiplication with inputs of two ciphertexts of lengths a|R| and b|R| outputs a (a + b − 1)|R|-length ciphertext. Thus, in the iCPM, the communication overhead of the responder increases to 6θ|R|. It is concluded that the communication overhead of the eCPM and the iCPM are constantly dependent on system parameters (θ, λ).
The iPPM extends the iCPM by building complex predicates. From the protocol description, we observe that if a predicate includes n ≥ 1 comparisons, the communication overhead of the iPPM would be approximately n times of that in the iCPM. 
B. Anonymity
Suppose that user u i is currently using pseudonym pid i to execute profile matching with others. We consider an adversary aiming to break the k-anonymity of u i . k-anonymity [47] is a classic concept for evaluating anonymity. It implies that a series of comparison results provide k-anonymity protection to a user if the user's behavior cannot be distinguished from at least k − 1 other users. We have the following definition:
Definition 4. The k-anonymity risk level of a user is defined as the inverse of the minimum number of distinct protocol runs (MNDPR) that are required to break the user's k-anonymity.
From this definition, the k-anonymity risk level reflects the difficulty that the adversary can break a user's k-anonymity. In the iCPM and the iPPM, the profile matching initiator does not reveal its attribute values to the responder, and the responder has no clue about the comparison result and only reveals the self-defined messages which are not related to the profile. In this case, a user's k-anonymity risk level can be minimum, i.e., no matter how many protocol runs are executed, its kanonymity risk level is always the lowest. Therefore, the iCPM and the iPPM both provide full anonymity (put users at minimum anonymity risk).
For the eCPM, it exposes the comparison results to users and thus obviously puts users at risk of the disclosure of attribute values. Because every eCPM run is executed for a particular attribute (which is specified by the initiator), any user u i has a k-anonymity risk level on its each individual attribute. When "=" case happens, users have higher anonymity level because they will be indistinguishable from other users with the same attribute values. In the following, we consider the worst case where users have distinctive attribute values on a single attribute. For a given attribute a x , we assume N,x , where a i,x is the value of u i on a x . In order to break u i 's k-anonymity on a x , the adversary has to make comparisons 'a α,x > a i,x ' and 'a i,x > a β,x ' for β − α − 1 < k so that the anonymity set of a i,x has a size smaller than k. Let I and J respectively be the numbers of larger and smaller values on a x among all the users that have not been compared to a i,x . Let K ≤ I and L ≤ J respectively be the number of such un-compared values in the k-anonymity set of a i,x . The relations among I, J, K, and L are shown in Fig. 5 . Assuming the contact is uniformly random, we define a recursive function f as shown in Eqn. (1) .
The above function f (I, J, K, L) returns the MNDPR with respect to a user's k-anonymity on a x in the eCPM. Thus, the user's anonymity risk level in this case is defined as L = 1/f (I, J, K, L). Since we assumed a 1,x , · · · a N,x are sorted in a descending order, the index i actually reflects the rank of a i,x among the attribute values. Fig. 6 plots the MNDPR f (I, J, K, L) and the k-anonymity risk level L in terms of 78 users' attribute values where k = 5, 10, · · · , 25. It can be seen that a user with a median attribute value will have a lower kanonymity risk level than those with larger or smaller values. This is reasonable because the user with a median attribute value is less distinctive from other users.
VIII. PERFORMANCE ENHANCEMENT
We have derived the maximum number of distinct eCPM runs (MNDPR) before a user's k-anonymity is broken. This number is obtained under an assumption of uniformly random contact. However, in reality, users as social entities are likely to gather with others who have similar attribute values. This situation increases user anonymity risk level quickly when profile matching is executed frequently, and the k-anonymity can be broken within a much smaller number of the eCPM runs as a result. Recall that multi-pseudonym techniques are used to protect user identity and location privacy. Similar to previous works [24] , [25] , here we consider that pseudonyms themselves are unlinkable. In the eCPM, if a user does not change the pseudonym, the comparison result will be easily linked to break the k-anonymity. If a user changes pseudonym for each protocol run, the information revealed by the protocol cannot be directly linked, and the user obtains highest anonymity. Nevertheless, it is desirable that the user changes pseudonym only when necessary, since pseudonyms are limited resources and have associated cost [24] , [25] (e.g., communication cost for obtaining them from the TCA and computation cost for generating them on the TCA). Thus, Our goal is to improve the anonymity strength of the eCPM by combining it with a pre-adaptive pseudonym change strategy which enables users to take necessary pseudonym change action before their k-anonymity is broken. The new verso of the eCPM is referred to as eCPM+. Before presenting the preadaptive strategy, we first propose a post-adaptive pseudonym change strategy, where users measure their anonymity risk levels periodically and change their pseudonym after their anonymity risk levels becomes larger than a pre-defined threshold value.
The post-adaptive strategy assumes that a user u j as responder runs the protocol on an attribute a x with an initiator u i (recognized by seeing the same pseudonym) only once, and refuses to participate any subsequent protocol running on the same a x with u i . However, if u i has changed its pseudonym since the last protocol running with u j , then u j will consider 
In the above computation, u i needs to know N and its value rank i. The information can be obtained from the TCA when u i registers to the TCA. If users are allowed to freely leave and enter the network, they will need to de-register/re-register themselves with the TCA when leaving/joining the network. In this case, (N, t) are changing, and the TCA has to be involved in the network operation in order to maintain latest network status and update users with the latest information.
The post-adaptive strategy also relies on pseudonym lifetime for making pseudonym change decisions. Suppose that user u i is currently using pseudonym pid i . The longer pid i has been used, the more private information of u i is leaked in case its anonymity has been broken. Hence, when u i 's anonymity risk level L i has stayed unchanged for a certain duration, called the lifetime of pid i and denoted by τ (pid i ), u i changes its pseudonym for damage control. However, τ (pid i ) should not be given as a constant value, but subject to L i . The higher L i is, the more possible the anonymity of u i is broken, and therefore the smaller τ (pid i ) is. We define
, where MNDPR i is obtained by Eqn. 1 and ξ > 1 is the pseudonym lifetime factor.
For the pre-adaptive pseudonym change strategy, each user u i initializes an ARMA model for its neighborhood status on every attribute when entering the network. Since it has w attributes, the number of ARMA models to be initialized is w. At the end of each time slot, it measures its current neighborhood status on each attribute and updates the corresponding ARMA models. It takes the post-adaptive strategy for each attribute to determine whether to change its pseudonym. In case pseudonym change is not suggested, it proceeds to predict the neighborhood status on all the attributes in the following time slot using the ARMA models. If one of the predicted neighborhood status leads to an unacceptable anonymity risk level, it changes its pseudonym; otherwise, it does not. The pre-adaptive strategy strengths the post-adaptive strategy by one-step ahead prediction based decision making and generally enhances user anonymity.
IX. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The eCPM+ addresses accumulative anonymity risk in multiple protocol runs and tunes itself automatically to maintain desired anonymity strength. Some previous works [21] , [22] are concerned only with the anonymity risk brought by each individual protocol run, and some works [23] reduce anonymity risk by manually adjusting certain threshold values. Though they provide the conditional anonymity as the eCPM, they are not comparable to the eCPM and the eCPM+ because the anonymity protection of users is considered in terms of consecutive protocol runs. Therefore, in this section we evaluate the eCPM+ (which uses a pre-adaptive pseudonym change strategy) in comparison with two other eCPM variants, respectively employing a constant pseudonym change interval z (CONST-z) and a post-adaptive pseudonym change strategy (Post).
A. Simulation Setup
Our simulation study is based on the real trace [48] collected from 78 users attending a conference during a four-day period. A contact means that two users come close to each other and their attached Bluetooth devices detect each other. The users' Bluetooth devices run a discovery program every 120 seconds on average and logged about 128, 979 contacts. Each contact is characterized by two users, a start-time, and a duration. In CONST-z, we set the pseudonym change interval z from 1 to 40 (time slots); in the post-adaptive and pre-adaptive strategies, we set pseudonym lifetime factor ξ = 30. In the pre-adaptive strategy, we use ARMA order (10, 5) .
We use the contact data to generate user profiles. According to social community observations [49] , users within the same social community often have common interests and are likely interconnected through strong social ties [11] . The stronger tie two users have, the more likely they contact frequently. Let f i,j denote the number of contacts of users u i and u j . We build a complete graph of users and weight each edge (u i , u j ) by f i,j . By removing the edges with a weight smaller then 100, we obtain a graph G containing 78 vertices and 2863 edges. We find all maximal cliques in G using the Bron-Kerbosch algorithm [50] . A clique is a complete subgraph. A maximal clique is a clique that cannot be extended by including one more adjacent vertex. We obtain the 7550 maximal cliques C 1 , · · · , C 7550 that all contain ≥ 15 users.
Without loss of generality, we assume that these cliques are sorted in the descending order of the weight sum of their edges (the weight sum of C 1 is the largest). We then construct communities in the following way. Scan the sequence of cliques from C 1 to C 7550 . For a scanned clique C i , find a clique C j that has been previously scanned and identified as core clique and contains ≥ 80% vertices of C i . If there are multiple such cliques, take the one with largest weight sum as C j . If C j is found, assign C i with the same attribute as C j ; otherwise, generate a new attribute, assign it to C i , and mark C i as a core clique. After the attribute generation and assignment, merge the cliques with the same attribute into a community. A community contains multiple users, and a user may belong to multiple communities. From the above settings, we generate 349 attributes and thus obtain 349 communities. We however concentrate on the first generated 100 attributes and their corresponding communities for simplicity. On average, each of these considered communities contains 28 users, and each user belongs to 38 communities.
Afterwards, we assign values to each user in G for these 100 attributes. For an attribute a x , we find the corresponding community C x and do the following. For each user in C x , we compute the weight sum of its incidental edges in C x ; for each vertex outside C x , we compute the weight sum of its incident edges to the vertices in C x ; then, we sort all the users in the decreasing order of their weight sums and assigned their values on a x with (78, 77, · · · , 1). This assignment method is reasonable because a large weight sum indicates a large interest in communicating with users in C x and thus a strong background in the aspect represented by a x .
Our simulation spans 10, 000 time slots, each lasting 30 seconds, and focuses on a randomly selected attribute. Users can change their pseudonym at the beginning of each time slot. The pseudonym is corrupted in terms of k-anonymity (on the selected attribute) if there are less than k − 1 other users in the network that will obtain the same matching results in the same protocol settings. A user experiences an anonymity break (on the selected attribute) if it is using a corrupted pseudonym. Figure 7 shows the anonymity break period experienced by each user with the constant strategy being used. It can be seen that when z = 1, each user experiences the shortest anonymity break period at the cost of 10, 000 pseudonyms per user. Anonymity break is still possible in this extreme case because users may have multiple contacts within a single time slot while they are still using the same pseudonym. If a user has a more restrictive anonymity requirement (e.g., from 10-anonymity to 30-anonymity) or uses a larger pseudonym change interval (from 1 time slot to 20 time-slots), it will have more corrupted pseudonyms and thus suffer a longer period of anonymity break.
B. Simulation Results
The neighborhood status of a user on a given attribute is characterized by the number of neighbors with larger values and the number of neighbors with smaller values. We investigate the regularity of neighborhood status of individual users over time and justify the effectiveness of pre-adaptive strategy. To do so, we randomly choose two users, ranked respectively the 7th and the 32nd. Figure 8 shows their neighborhood status. The 7th user's neighborhood status exhibits a regular change, i.e., the number of neighbors with larger values stays stable, and that of neighbors with smaller values decrease linearly over time. For the 32nd user, the number of users with larger values and the number of users with smaller values both decrease.
We choose the 32nd user, who in general has a lower anonymity risk level than that of the 7th user, and show its 10-anonymity risk level in two consecutive time periods (2000, 3200) and (8200, 9400) with the post-adaptive strategy in Fig 9. The anonymity risk level threshold is th = 0.15. In the figure, the drop from a high risk level to a low risk level indicates a pseudonym change. Recall that a user changes its pseudonym not only when the anonymity risk level is beyond threshold th but also when its current pseudonym expires. This is reflected by the anonymity risk level drop happened below the threshold line in the figure. From Fig. 8 , we can see that the pseudonym change frequency is high when the user encounters a large number of neighbors. This is reasonable as a large number of profile matching runs are executed in this case, and the user's anonymity risk level grows quickly. When the level is beyond a pre-defined threshold, the user changes its pseudonym. Figure 10 shows the performance of the constant, the postadaptive and the pre-adaptive strategies respectively for 5-anonymity and 10-anonymity, in relation with threshold th.
The results are obtained with respect to the 32nd user. For the constant strategy, multiple lines are plotted, respectively corresponding to z = {1, 2, 4, 10, 20, 40}. As z goes up, the user consumes a decreasingly number of pseudonyms and has an increasingly break ratio (the ratio of the number of time slots that the k-anonymity of the 32nd user is broken to 10,000). It can be seen that the number of pseudonyms consumed by the post-adaptive and pre-adaptive strategies are much smaller than those of the constant strategy. For example, in the case of 5-anonymity and th = 0.0763, the post-adaptive strategy spends 369 pseudonyms and results in a 514 time slot anonymity break period. The constant strategy consumes 500(> 369) pseudonyms and has a 0.0540(> 0.0514) break ratio. The post-adaptive strategy outperforms the constant strategy in anonymity protection by using fewer pseudonyms to achieve smaller break ratio. Similar phenomena are observed for other th values and 10-anonymity scenario as well. In particular, we find that as expected, the pre-adaptive strategy leads to yet better anonymity performance than the post-adaptive one. Fig. 10 shows that in case of 5-anonymity and th = 0.0763, the pre-adaptive strategy consumes 449(> 369) pseudonyms and results in a 0.0445(< 0.0514) break ratio. The pre-adaptive strategy consumes slightly more pseudonyms, but achieves significantly shorter anonymity break period.
X. CONCLUSION
We have investigated a unique comparison-based profile matching problem in Mobile Social Networks (MSNs), and proposed novel protocols to solve it. The explicit Comparisonbased Profile Matching (eCPM) protocol provides conditional anonymity. It reveals the comparison result to the initiator. Consider the k-anonymity as a user requirement, we analyze the anonymity risk level in relation to the pseudonym change for consecutive eCPM runs. We have further introduced an enhanced version of the eCPM, i.e., eCPM+, by exploiting the prediction-based strategy and adopting the pre-adaptive pseudonym change. The effectiveness of the eCPM+ is validated through extensive simulations using real-trace data. We have also devised two protocols with full anonymity, i.e., implicit Comparison-based Profile Matching (iCPM) and implicit Predicate-based Profile Matching (iPPM). The iCPM handles profile matching based on a single comparison of an attribute while the iPPM is implemented with a logical expression made of multiple comparisons spanning multiple attributes. The iCPM and the iPPM both enable users to anonymously request for messages and respond to the requests according to the profile matching result, without disclosing any profile information.
In the current version of the iCPM and the iPPM, we implement ">" and "<" operations for profile matching. One future work is to extend them to support more operations, such as "≥" and "≤". Another future work is to hide the predicate information in the iPPM. Currently, the responder needs to transmit the threshold value of the predicate to the initiator, which may reveal partial information of the responder's interest. Restricting the disclosure of such parameter will be of significance for advancing comparison-based family of profile matching protocols and warrants deep investigation. 
